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CASE NOTES
CORPORATIONS - Right of Board Chairman to Pur-
chase Corporation's Own Stock Without Authority. -
Plaintiff, a stockholder of the Corporation, brought suit for
account against chairman of the board of directors who pur-
chased corporation's stock supposedly for its benefit to pre-
vent loss of control to outsiders. Plaintiff also brought suit
against the board of directors who ratified the purchase, al-
leging that such wasteful act was carried out for no proper
corporate purpose, and for no other reason than to keep the
chairman in control of the corporation's affairs and those
subservient to him in office. HELD: Order for the Plaintiff.
The transaction complained of was consummated and ap-
proved without study as to whether a real threat of injury
to the corporation did exist. The business judgement rule may
not be relied on to bar plaintiff's attack on the action of which
he complains. Propp v. Sadacca, 175 A.2d 33 (Del. Ch. 1961).
English common law invalidated a corporation's purchase
of its own shares on the ground that it was an indirect method
of reducing capital, an evasion of statutory restrictions on
such reduction, and thus inconsistent with the privilege of
limited liability to creditors. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS §
256 (rev. ed. 1946). The Companies Act of 1862, the first
"'general incorporation statute", upon which the modern cor-
poration law of England rests, did not authorize reduction
of capital stock. Levy, Purchase By An English Company of
Its Own Shares, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1931). Although the
present law permits it under court control, neither the English
courts, Treavor v. Wintworth, 12 App. Gas. 409 (1887), nor
the present English statute, Companies Act of 1918, 11 and 12
Geo. 6, C: 38, 866, provide for the purchase by a corporation
of its own shares. This is the minority rule in the United
States, Kieth v. Kilmer, 261 Fed. 313 (1st Cir. 1920) ; Barrett
v. Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 302, 175 N.E. 765, (1931), and most
American jurisdictions follow the so-called Massachusetts rule
that absent a statutory restriction a solvent corporation may
purchase its own shares if it acts in good faith and without
prejudice to the rights of creditors or other shareholders.
Scriggins v. Thomas Dalby Co., 290 Mass. 414, 195 N.E. 749
(1935). Although the acquisition by a corporation of its own
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stock is rarely an essential corporate function, Brophy v.
Cities Ser. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 258, 70 A.2d 5 (1949), a corpora-
tion may purchase its own stock if this does not diminish its
ability to pay debts or lessen the security of its creditors.
In re International Radiator Co., 10 Del. Ch. 358, 92 Atl. 255
(1914); See Pasotti v. Guardian Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 1, 156
Atl. 255 (1931). Like the A.B.C. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 5
and other modern corporation statutes, e.g., N. C. GEN. STATS.
§ 55-52, N. Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 513, the SOUTH CAROLINA
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, of 1962 authorizes a corporation
to purchase its own shares, S. C. Bus. CORP. ACT § 5.17, but
permits purchase ordinarily only out of earned surplus if
either the articles or shareholders authorize it, Id. § 5.17 (b),
and for certain exceptional purposes, including redemption
of redeemable shares, stated capital may be used. It appears
that a majority of states in one way or another allow cor-
porations within their jurisdictions to purchase their own
shares of stock, subject to various stipulations and limitations.
A good rule to follow, incident to a corporation's purchase
of its own shares, is the "business judgment rule." Essentially
it says that corporate officers must exercise reasonable in-
telligence and complete good faith, and are not responsible
for mere errors of judgment or want of prudence short of
clear and gross negligence. Feilding v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 137
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; Murphy v. Hanlon, 322 Mass. 683, 79 N.E.2d
292 (1948). The purchase by a corporation of its own capital
stock rests entirely within the discretion of the board of di-
rectors, and the courts will not interfere unless there is fraud
or misconduct, Bangers See. Corp. v. Kresge Dep't Stores, Inc.,
54 F. Supp. 378 (D. Del. 1944), and in the absence of special
circumstances, corporate officers and employees may per-
sonally purchase and sell its stock at will and without liability
to the corporation, Brophy v Cities Serv. Co., supra. In South
Carolina, corporate officers stand in a fiduciary relation to-
ward the corporation and its shareholders as far as corporate
business is concerned. Gilbert v. McLeod Infirmary, 219 S.C.
174, 64 S.E.2d 524 (1951). This rule is now codified in the
new corporation law, S. C. Bus. CORP. ACT of 1962 § 8.15. An
honest decision by the board of directors to buy out a stock-
holder who threatens actual harm to the corporation has been
sustained, Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136, (Del. Ch. 1960) ; but
new shares of corporate stock cannot be issued for improper
[Vol. 14556
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purposes, such as to maintain control of a corporation, Kings-
ton v. Home Life Ins. Co., 11 Del. ch. 258, 101 Atl. 898
(1917). But cf. Standard Int'l. Corp. v. McDonald Printing
Co., Inc., 159 N.E.2d 822 (1959). Each case of breach of
fiduciary duty by directors to a corporation or its share-
holders must be decided on its own facts. Kors v. Carey, supra.
This rule has been followed by the courts in the jurisdiction
of the principal case and is seemingly directly applicable to it.
It would appear that the Court in the instant case reached
an equitable conclusion. If corporations are allowed to deal
in their own shares for the purpose of advancing the general
well-being of the enterprise, then it is not unreasonable that
such activity be restricted to certain well-defined regulations,
either as set forth by the corporation's by-laws or by state
statute. Since directors and officers occupy positions of trust
within the corporation, they should not be allowed to shield
their activity on behalf of the corporation from shareholders
or creditors by simply asserting that a particular decision
has been reached in accordance with sound business principles.
It would seem that the so-called "business judgment rule"
should not be a complete defense for a director or other cor-
porate office holder against a creditor or aggrieved stock-
holder, who, for an apparently valid reason, demands an ac-
counting. Since a stockholder may be indeed prejudiced by the
corporation's purchase of its own shares, even though mani-
festly made in good faith, it is by no means an immoderate
practice to allow an accounting, especially when the suit is
brought to prevent what appears to be an obvious danger to
the corporation.
W. RICHARD JAMES
CRIMINAL LAW - Fair Trial - Photography in Court-
room. - Defendant, an eighteen-year-old Negro man, was
indicted for the crime of assault with intent to ravish, the al-
leged victim being a young white woman about twenty-one
years of age. During proceedings trial judge permitted pho-
tographers and newsreel men to take pictures in the courtroom
in the presence of the jury. The defendant was convicted and
a subsequent motion for a new trial was made, heard and
refused. Thereafter, defendant was sentenced to death. On
1962]
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appeal, HELD: Reversed and remanded for a new trial. The
Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge committed error in
permitting photographs to be taken in connection with the
trial of the case. State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 164, 122 S.E.2d
622 (1961).
A universally recognized principle of law is that a defendant
in a criminal case may not legally be found guilty except in
a trial in which his constitutional rights are scrupulously ob-
served. And no conviction can stand nor can anyone be de-
prived of life or liberty, no matter how overwhelming the
evidence of guilt, if he is denied any element of due process
of law. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir.
1951). The concept of fair trial has been guaranteed specifi-
cally by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion and by implication through judicial interpretation of the
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 681, 87 L.Ed. 546 (1942). A fair trial means
a trial before an impartial judge, an honest jury, and in an
atmosphere of judicial calm, State v. Gossett, 117 S.C. 76, 108
S.E. 290 (1921) ; State v. Carter, 233 N.C. 581, 65 S.E.2d 9
(1951), and the denial of such a trial amounts to a denial of
due process of law. Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 77 L.Ed. 158
(1932) ; Helton v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1953).
The court must determine the manner in which justice shall
be administered with dignity and decorum so as to insure a
fair and impartial trial without interference or distraction
such as to impair ascertainment of truth. In re Hearings
Concerning Canon 35, 296 P.2d 465 (Colo. 1956); Douglas,
The Public Trial and the Free Press, 46 A.B.A.J. 840 (1960) ;
State v. Weldon, 91 S.C. 29, 74 S.E. 43, (1911). The constitu-
tional right of the accused is a privilege intended for his
benefit. It does not entitle the press or the public to take
advantage of his involuntary exposure at the bar of justice
to employ photographic means of picturing his plight in the
toils of law. Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312, (1927).
In the exercise of guarantying this privilege to the accused,
the courts may prevent conduct of the press which threatens
the orderly conduct of the trial, and preventing courtroom
photography falls within the scope of this power. Canons of
Judicial Ethics of Am. Bar Ass'n, Canon 35, 17 P.S. Art. 61-65
(1937) ; FED. R. CRIM. P. 53; Bisignano v. Municipal Court of
558 [Vol. 14
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Des Moines, 237 Iowa 895, 23 N.W.2d 523 (1946); cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 818, 91 L.Ed. 1270 (1946). Even if cameras
are hidden, still the psychological effect of having cameras
present would nonetheless be distracting, and result in the
degeneration of dignity and decorum to the point of causing
loss of respect for law, order, and the courts. In re Mack, 386
Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956). If the dominant right to main-
tain order and decorum should yield to an asserted privilege of
the press, the authority and dignity of the courts would be
seriously impaired. Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas,
153 F. Supp. 486 (W. D. Pa. 1957) ; aff'd, 254 F.2d 883 (3rd
Cir. 1958). The leading case of State v. Clifford, 162 Ohio St.
370, 123 N.E.2d 8 (1954) ; cert. denied, 349 U.S. 929, 99 L.Ed.
1259 (1955), summed up the press-judiciary dispute when it
declared that a court in enforcing reasonable courtroom de-
corum is preserving the constitutional and unalienable right
of a litigant to a fair trial, and in preserving such right the
court does not interfere with the freedom of the press.
The judicial mockeries brought about by highly publicized
trials in the early part of this century emphasized the need
to curtail the infringements exercised by the press in the
courtroom. The first concrete manifestation of desire to abate
these detrimental activities was in the form of a resolution
adopted by the American Bar Association in 1932 which
sought to place a complete ban on press coverage, condemning
it as a breach of decorum in judicial proceedings and as an
interference with the administration of justice. The celebrated
and highly publicized Lindbergh Trial, State v. Hauptmann,
115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (1935), subsequently led to the
adoption in 1937 of Canon 35 which asserted that extensive
press activity degrades the court in general and that the
taking of photographs in the courtroom distracts the witnesses
as well as the actual parties and the jury from the requisite
attention to the proceedings. The Bar summed up the need
for such limitations in commenting that the restrictions posed
by Canon 35 were for the protection of the constitutionally
provided rights of the accused and for the promotion of the
orderly and expeditious administration of justice. Since that
time, Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has
been passed, relating to the same preventive power of the
court, which added momentum in the field and has led many
states to pass legislative enactments relating to this point.
1962]
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In many instances the wording was practically identical to
Canon 35 and Rule 53. The decision of the court in the instant
case falls directly within the principle generally proposed
prohibiting photography in the courtroom. There is a public
need to protect the innocent, and a constitutional provision
protects the guilty from a conviction which lacks the element
of fairness in any respect. The taking of photographs in the
courtroom during the progress of judicial proceedings or
during any recess thereof introduces extraneous influences
which tend to have a detrimental psychological effect on the
participants and to divert them from the proper objectives
of the trial. Indeed, any continuation of the assumption of
right by the press to photograph in the courtroom while
holding the freedom of the press as a shield, may prove an
opening wedge to a gradual deterioration of the judicial pro-
cess. The Supreme Court's decision and opinion in the present
case indicate that it feels the accused's right to a fair trial is
being encroached upon by members of the press in an attempt
to sell newspapers. Photography in the courtroom tends to
bring undue attention to sensationalism to the eyes of the jury
and otherwise to deny the accused a fair and impartial trial
in a calm and judicial atmosphere. Likewise, if retrial be-
comes necessary, wide-spread photographs of the first trial
might render it impossible to obtain an impartial jury. It
therefore becomes imperative that some step be taken to pre-
vent these injustices from occurring and ever reaching the
appellate court in the first place. It is submitted that South
Carolina needs a statutory provision similar to those passed
recently in many other states and advocated by Canon 35 and
Rule 53. The result of such legislative enactments would be
the reduction of appeals on the error in point and an overall
lessening of periodic tension between the courts and the press.
In so acting, the legislative body would be doing its share in
assuring all accused persons their constitutionally provided
fair day in court.
TERRY M. BROOKS
LABOR LAW - State Court Jurisdiction Under the La-
bor Management Relations Act. - Following the expiration
of a collective bargaining agreement and negotiations toward
a new contract, a stipulation was entered into by the employer
[Vol. 1
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and union continuing in effect most provisions of the old
contract, but allowing certain wage increases and holiday
changes. Although the employer had announced it would put
the changes in effect, it later refused to sign a proposed new
agreement with the "stipulation" embodied therein and noti-
fied its employees that it would return to the old rates. The
change was based upon the allegation that the employer's
bargaining representatives had acted without authority in
negotiation of the new agreement. The union recovered da-
mages for violation of the collective bargaining agreement in
the Superior Court of Massachusetts and the Supreme Judicial
Court affirmed, overruling the employer's claim that Section
301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act gave the
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of these suits. The em-
ployer appeals. HELD: Affirmed. The purpose of conferring
jurisdiction upon federal district courts was simply to supple-
ment the jurisdiction of the state courts over labor contracts.
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 7 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1962).
An employee was discharged after he drove a fork lift truck
off a loading platform and the union protested his discharge.
Even though the employer claimed the employee had been
discharged for unsatisfactory work, the union called a strike
which had an eight-day duration. After the strike was over,
the issue was submitted to arbitration as provided in the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The Board of Arbitration ruled
that the discharge was justified and that the employee was
not entitled to reinstatement. The employer sought damages
in the Washington courts under the Labor Management Re-
lations Act for losses caused by the strike, on the ground that
by calling the strike and not submitting the issue to arbitration
the union violated the collective bargaining agreement. A
verdict for the employer was affirmed by Department Number
One of the Supreme Court of Washington, that court holding
that Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
did not preempt state jurisdiction or limit the substantive
law to be applied, and expressly applied state law. The union
appeals. HELD: Affirmed. While the state court has juris-
diction under the act, federal law should have been applied.
The law applied is in accord with the federal law, so no re-
versal is necessary. Local 174 Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour
Co., 7 L. Ed.2d 593 (1962).
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It has long been established that the National Labor Re-
lations Act, 61 Stat. 136 et. seq. (1947), 29 USC § 141, et. seq.
(1958), confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the National Labor
Relations Board over cases involving unfair labor practices,
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 82 L.Ed. 638
(1938) ; and federal courts may not redress by injunction or
otherwise the unfair labor practices defined in the act. Ama-
zon Mill Co. v. Textile Workers, 167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948).
Controversies subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board are also withdrawn from the state courts,
Garner v. Teamsters, Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 98 L.Ed. 228
(1953) ; and they are barred from enjoining picketing, San
Diego Bldg. Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 3 L.Ed. 2d 775
(1959) ; except where warranted for protection of the public
safety. Garner v. Teamsters, Local 776, supra. State courts
may still, however, employ their traditional equity powers to
require adherence to collective bargaining agreements. General
Bldg. Contractors v. Local 542, 370 Pa. 73, 87 A.2d 250, 32
A.L.R.2d 822 (1952). This power is not altered by Section
301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C., § 185 (a) (1958), since it applies only to
suits for damages and not to those for injunctive relief. Phila-
delphia Marine Ass'n. v. International Longshoremen Local
1291, 382 Pa. 326, 115 A.2d 733 (1955). Also, the granting of
exclusive rights to the NLRB to grant injunctions in collective
bargaining cases does not preclude the courts from enforcing
substantive contract rights, even though the violation of the
contract is also an unfair labor practice. Textile Workers
v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951). The validity
of an arbitration award may likewise be determined by the
state courts, and federal courts will not enjoin its enforcement.
Ryan Aeronautical Co. v. UAW, Local 506, 179 F. Supp. 1
(S.D. Cal. 1959).
Some federal decisions have indicated that § 301 might give
federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction of actions for
damages for breach of collective bargaining agreements, In-
ternational Plainfield Motor Co. v. Local No. 343, 123 F. Supp.
683 (D. N.J. 1954) ; one court taking the position that the
inclusion of the phrase "and in any other court having juris-
diction of the parties" in § 303 (b) and its absence in § 301
made federal jurisdiction under § 301 exclusive. Association
of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210
[Vol. 14
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F.2d 623 (3rd Cir. 1954), aff'd 348 US 437, 99 L.Ed. 510
(1955). The Labor Management Relations Act definitely does
not preclude a state court from entertaining a common law
tort action for damages predicated upon an unfair labor
practice. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,
347 U.S. 656, 98 L.Ed. 1025 (1954). Federal district courts
have recognized jurisdiction in the state courts for violation
of employer-union agreements by refusing to take them when
removal was attempted, Associated Tel. Co. v. Communication
Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1953) ; and by remanding
them to the state courts on request of one of the parties.
Castle & Cook Terminals v. Local 137, Int'l Longshoremen,
110 F. Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953). State law may be applied
by federal courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under
§ 301 (a) if it will effectuate the federal policy, and it will be
absorbed as a part of federal law, Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 1 L.Ed. 2d 972 (1957) ; and concurrent
jurisdiction in the state courts will be allowed in the absence
of "compelling Congressional direction" where the regulated
conduct is of local responsibility. San Diego Bldg. Council v.
Garmon, supra. The concurrent jurisdiction established by
the principal cases is not a novel feature in our federal system,
and has been recognized where federal courts were em-
powered to issue writs of habeas corpus, Robb v. Connoly,
111 U.S. 624, 28 L.Ed. 542 (1884) ; to hear suits in which a
bankrupt or his assignee is a party, Claflin v. Houseman, 93
U.S. 130, 23 L.Ed. 833 (1876) ; to try actions under the Mer-
chant Marine Act, Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S.
239, 87 L.Ed. 239 (1942) ; and to hear negligence suits under
federal statute making the initial common carrier liable for
negligence of a connecting carrier. Missouri ex rel St. Louis,
B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 226 U.S. 200, 69 L.Ed. 247 (1924).
Congress may make federal jurisdiction exclusive, but in the
absence of such express or implied intention, state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction when competent within their own
constitutions. Clafilin v. Houseman, supra.
Since Congress apparently considers the state courts com-
petent to decide federal law in cases involving less than the
minimum amount of money required under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
they should be allowed to exercise concurrent jurisdiction
with the federal district courts in matters so predominantly
local in nature as a simple breach of contract. A collective
1962]
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bargaining contract varies in no substantial way from simple
everyday business dealings, except that it may contain terms
requiring some expertise for their complete understanding.
The essentials of a proper contract, if present in the collective
bargaining agreement, are discernible by a diligent state tri-
bunal even if they are hidden by a maze of labor terms. This
is all that the courts need determine. Determining whether
or not the parties have breached their agreement is not a
peculiarly federal function unless made so by Congress. Con-
gress has not gone this far, and while they expressly granted
concurrent state jurisdiction under § 303 (b), this casts no
light upon the subject of state jurisdiction under § 301 (a).
General Elec. v. UAW, 108 N.E.2d 211 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
The state courts in the exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction
established by the first noted case should not be restricted
to the application of federal law as the second case holds.
Such a restriction is unnecessary, especially since the existing
body of federal contract law is in general accord with most
state law in that field. The restriction is unrealistic because,
as in the noted case, a decision expressly made under state
law will almost always have to be affirmed as being in accord
with the general federal principles. Federal couits will un-
avoidably rely on some state law in deciding cases under this
act and to say the state courts may not do the same is to
place restrictions upon them which are not placed upon the
federal courts. The federal courts will be engaged in bringing
state law into the federal fold and branding it federal
law, but the state courts will be restricted to that created by
this rustling and cannot apply that which created it. Has it
been forgotten that water is purest at the spring?
C. JOSEPH ROOF
TORTS - Libel and Slander - Attorney's Absolute Priv-
ilege Inapplicable to Statement Given Newspaper. -- The
defendant, an attorney representing an accused Negro rapist,
reported to the local newspaper the Negro's assertion that the
white married victim (plaintiff in the present case) had sub-
mitted willingly to his advances. The state's attorney had
furnished the newspaper with a report of the Negro's confes-
sion, and defendant insisted that his client's defense be
published in the same article. Plaintiff thereupon sued the
[Vol. 14
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss4/7
CASE NOTES
attorney for slander. Defendant answered that the statement
was qualifiedly privileged, as he was acting in good faith to
protect his client from a possible lynching, and asserted that,
in any event, he enjoyed an attorney's absolute privilege for
statement made in the course of a judicial proceeding. Judg-
ment was entered on a directed verdict for the defendant. On
appeal, HELD: Reversed. The statement was not qualifiedly
privileged because published to persons who had no interest
corresponding to defendant's duty to protect his client, and
not absolutely privileged because not "in the course of a
judicial proceeding." Kennedy v. Cannon, 182 A.2d 54 (Md.
Ct. of App. 1962).
The right of free speech is in some cases allowed to prevail
over the right to reputation, in apparent derogation of the
theoretical competency of the law to afford a remedy for
every wrong. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation:
Judicial Proceedings, 9 -COLUM. L. REV. 463 (1909). On the
ground of public policy, the law recognizes certain communica-
tions as privileged, and, as such, not within the rules imposing
liability forr defamation. 33 Am. JUR. Libel and Slander § 124
(1938). A qualified privilege is established if the facts, al-
thdugh untrue, were published on a lawful occasion, without
malice, with a justifiable purpose; and with a reasonable
belief in their truth. Chagnon v. Union Leader Corp., 103
N.H. 426, 174 A.2d 825 (1961) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 593
(1938). On-the other hand, if an absolute privilege be estab-
lished, proof 'of neither malice nor want of probable truth
will impair the defense. PROSSER, ToRTS § 95 (2nd ed. 1955) ;
1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 5.21 (1956). Such a broad im-
munity is granted not so much for the protection of individ-
uals, as in the- case of a qualified privilege, but rather for
protection of the public's.interest in unhampered expression
under certain circumstances. Veeder, op. cit. supra at 463.
This is usually limited to statements arising in legislative,
judicial, and some executive proceedings. Fulton v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 220 S.C. 287, 67 S.E. 2d 425 (1951) ; 33 Am.
JUR., supra § 125.
English common law jurists early recognized that an ef-
ficient juridical system requires free disclosure of facts with-
out fear of a subsequent defamation suit. Brook v. Montague,
Cro. Jac. 90, 79 Eng. Rep. '77 (1605) ; Seaman v. Netherclift,
2 C.P.D. 53, 46 L.J.CP. 128 (1876). "Neither party, witness,
1962]
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counsel, jury or judge," said Lord Mansfield, "can be put
to answer civilly or criminally for words spoken in offices."
King v. Skinner, Loff 55, 98 Eng. Rep. 529, 530 (1772). The
judicial immunity afforded in England today is considerably
broader than that in this country; the British rule gives com-
plete protection if the statement arise in the course of a
judicial proceeding and has -any reasonable relation to it,
although quite irrelevant to any issue involved. Munster v.
Lamb, 11 Q.B.D. 588 (1883) ; PROSSER, OP. cit. supra. It is a
fair statement of the general American rule that any state-
ment uttered by a judge, juror, litigant, attorney or witness
enjoys an absolute privilege if it arises in the course of a
judicial proceeding and is relevant thereto. Borg v. Boas, 231
F.2d 788 (1956) ; 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 104 (1948).
"Relevant" does not refer to the technical rule of evidence;
normally all that is required is that the party have an honest
belief in the statement's relevancy. Bleeker v. Drury, 149 F.2d
770 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Johnston v. Dover, 201 Ark. 175, 143 S.W.
2d 1112 (1940). Ordinarily all doubt is resolved in favor of
the defamer. Bleeker v. Drury, supra; Feldman v. Bernham,
179 N.Y.S. 2d 881 (1958). Whether a given statement "arises
within the course of a judicial proceeding" is often a nice
point. The minority view is that it must occur after the be-
ginning of the proceeding proper and before it end. Kruse v.
Rabe, 80 N.J.L. 378, 79 A. 316 (1910) ; see also PROSSER, op.
cit. supra at 610. The Restatment, however, extends the at-
torney's privilege to communications "preliminary to a pro-
posed litigation," 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 586 (1938), but
the comments under that same section and the cases limit
such preliminary communications to pre-trial conferences with
clients, witnesses, or expert consultants. Many courts require
that the communication be necessary for the coming litigation.
Robinson v. Home Fire Ins. Co., 244 Iowa 1084, 49 N.W. 2d
521 (1951), Rodgers v. Wise, 193 S.C. 5, 7 S.E. 2d 517 (1940).
But it must be shown that the statement was made to one
actually involved, or about to be involved, in the proceeding.
Washer v. Bank of America Ass'n, 21 Cal. 2d 822, 136 P.2d
297 (1943); Kennedy v. Cannon, supra. Thus an attorney
who spoke disparagingly of the opposing counsel after the
trial was outside privilege. Viosca v. Langfried, 140 La. 609,
73 So. 698 (1916). Also a libelous statement given to a
newspaper by an attorney "to prevent the spread of an 'un-
[Vol. 14
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founded rumor'" was found unprivileged. Jacobs v. Herlands,
17 N.Y.S. 2d 711 (1940). "An attorney who wishes to litigate
his case in the press will do so at his own risk." Kennedy v.
Cannon, supra.
The trial court instructed for the defendant, apparently
feeling that his action was qualifiedly privileged, since the
prosecuting attorney had published a statement damaging
to the defendant's client. The Court of Appeals dismissed this
notion rather summarily, holding that the statement was
published to one who had no interest corresponding to the
defendant's duty to protect his client. The major portion of
the opinion was spent on a discussion of the defense of ab-.
solute privilege, which was not nearly so tenable as that of
the qualified privilege found by the court below. The triall
court, possibly impressed with the clear and present danger
facing the defendant's client, and the responsibility that im-
mediately arose, found a duty to speak, and apparently a
corresponding right to hear and re-publish. The appellate
court, in discussing the possible lynching, suggested to the
defendant that he should have moved for a change of venue,
or examined the jurors on their voir dire - both of which,
by the time of their usefulness, would have been like closing
the proverbial barn door. The absolute privilege, in this period
which is seeing various tort immunities crumble at their
foundations, has expanded only within a limited sphere, and
never reached the proportion considered by the appellate court
in the principal case. The opinion would have been much more
edifying, and more closely related to the findings in the court
below, had the Court of Appeals given a complete discussion
of the qualified privilege claim, which had-or should have
had-a greater chance of success. The qualified privilege was
apparently the first, and most persuading, line of defense in
the lower court.
MICHAEL W. TIGHE
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION - Availability for
Suitable Work - Refusal of Work on Sabbath for Religious
Reasons. - For thirty-five years plaintiff worked for de-
fendant's cotton mill. Plaintiff was and had since 1957 been
a conscientious member of the Seventh Day Adventist religion,
the tenets of which church require its members to abstaim
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from labor of any kind from sundown Friday until sundown
Saturday. Since the end of World War Two and until June 6,
1959, Saturday work had been optional at defendant's mills.
Since her conversion to the Seventh Day Adventist religion,
and prior to Friday, June 5, 1959, plaintiff had neither chosen
nor been required to work on Saturday. On that date plaintiff
was notified that thereafter all employees would be required
to work on Saturdays. She refused to report for work the next
six Saturdays and was discharged for her refusal to do so.
The Court of Common Pleas affirmed the full Commission's
decision in favor of the defendant and on appeal to the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina, HELD: Affirmed, plaintiff,
by restricting her availability for employment to those hours
not in conflict with her religion, was not "available for work"
and thereby disqualified herself from receiving benefits. Sher-
bert v. Verner, - S.C. -, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962).
The unemployment compensation laws were designed to
relieve the economic pressures and strife which result when
workers become unemployed through no fault of their own.
Judson Mills v. South Carolina Employment Security Comm'n,
204 S.C. 37, 28 S.E.2d 535 (1944) ; Unemployment Compen-
sation Comm'n v. Tomko 192 Va. 463 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951).
Generally, the unemployment compensation laws provide that
claimants must accept suitable work and that one of the cri-
teria for determining what work is suitable will be the degree
of risk to a claimant's health, safety, or morals. ALTmAN,
AVAILABILITY FOR WORK 283 (1950); Menard, 'Refusal of
Suitable Work, 55 YALE L. J. 134 (1945). A worker must be
ready, willing, and able to accept suitable employment. Schet-
tino v. Administrator, 138 Conn. 253, 83 A.2d 217 (1951);
Hunter v. Miller, 148 Neb. 402, 27 N.W.2d 638 (1947). The
South Carolina statute provides that an unemployed insured
worker shall be eligible to receive benefits if he or she is able
to work and is available for work. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA § 68-113 (1952). An insured worker may become
ineligible for work if he fails, without good cause either to
apply for available suitable work or to accept available suit-
able work. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 68-114 (1952).
The degree of risk to the health, safety, and morals of the
worker shall be considered in determining suitability of em-
ployment. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 68-114 (3) (a)
(1952). To be available for work, a worker must be genuinely
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attached to the labor market. Schettino v. Administrator,
supra; Roukey v. Riley, 96 N.H. 351, 77 A.2d 30 (1950). Re-
strictions of availability for personal reasons are not generally
allowed. Hartsville Cotton Mill v. South Carolina Employment
Security Comm'n, 224 S.C. 407, 79 S.E.2d 381 (1953) ; Judson
Mills v. South Carolina Employment Security Comm'n, supra.
The general rule is that an unemployed worker must be ready,
willing, and able to accept any work for which he has no good
reason to refuse. Garcia v. California Employment Stabiliza-
tion Comm'n 71 Cal.App.2d 107, 161 P.2d 972 (1945) ; Hega-
done v. Kirkpatrick, 66 Idaho 55, 154 P.2d 181 (1944). It has
been held that a worker must be available at all times of the
day or night and on any day of the week. Ford Motor Co. v.
Appeal Board, 316 Mich. 468, 25 N.W.2d 586 (1947). This
rule has been repudiated. In Re Miller 243 N.C. 509, 91 S.E.2d
241 (1956). A worker who was available for the normal work
period which was customary of the type of employment was
held to be available. Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Reg-
ulator Co., 240 Minn. 449, 61 N.W.2d 526 (1953). A fre-
quently used rule is that the worker must be available for
the work which he has been doing. Tung-Sol Elec. v. Board of
Review, 35 N.J. Super. 397, 114 A.2d 285 (App. Div. 1955) ;
Judson Mills v. South Carolina Employment Security Comm'n,
supra. Where a Jewish worker restricted his availability to
those days and hours which would not interfere with his Sab-
bath, the court denied benefits on the ground that the plaintiff
was not available where he voluntarily chose a religion and
a trade or occupation in conflict with each other. At that
time, there was no provision in the applicable statute which
required that the plaintiff's morals be considered in determin-
ing suitability. Kut v. Albers Super Mkt., 146 Ohio 522, 66
N.E.2d 643, appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 669, 9-1 L.Ed. 590. In
a later case from the same jurisdiction it was held, after enact-
ment of a "moral suitability" amendment, that where a claim-
ant's conscientious adherence to the tenets of the Seventh Day
Adventist religion required her to limit her availability, con-
flicting employment would not be suitable. Tary v. Board of
Review, Unemployment Compensation, 161 Ohio 251, 119 N.E.
2d 56 (1954). Similar decisions have been reached in Mich-
igan and North Carolina. Swenson v. Michigan Unemployment
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The Court, in the instant case, was faced with the interpre-
tation of a statute requiring that consideration be given to the
risk of the employment to the claimant's morals in determining
whether the employment would be suitable. The statute is
silent as to what constitutes moral risk. One of the basic
problems which the court was forced to resolve was whether
suitablility was to be determined on the basis of the nature of
the work or on the individual claimant's moral standards.
The better view, under the South Carolina law, is that the
character of the employment should be decisive. The Claimant
here had worked for thirty-five years in an industry in which
Saturday work was generally required. The claimant's change
of religion was a personal change, the nature of which made
Saturday work objectionable to her. In Judson Mills, supra,
a mother was held to be unavailable when a personal change of
situation made it necessary for her to limit her availability
in order to care for her children. Surely, if a mother were to
be required to accept employment and leave her children un-
attended, this would involve a risk to her morals. Nonetheless,
the court held that the change which brought about her un-
employment was a personal change, and compensation was
denied. The present claimant's change of religion was no less
a personal change. The Tary Case, the Swenson Case, and In
Re Miller, supra, all urged by the plaintiff as controlling,
reached their decision on the basis of the risk to the individual
South Carolina Court of problems it is facing today. There
claimant's morals. Under the controlling South Carolina
decisions the court correctly decided that in view of the pur-
pose for which the unemployment compensation laws were
passed, that the plaintiff shoud be denied compensation.
DAVID Y. MONTErtH, I1
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss4/7
